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Introduction 
1
INTRODUCTION  
 
The real challenge is to retain the culture of the organization in a changing and 
accelerating environment in the marketplace. My job is to keep the good things 
rolling and revise things that need revising. I don't want people to lose their passion 
for the things that have made this company a success.1
Walter T. Klenz, Chairman & CEO, Beringer Wine Estates. 
Peter Scott walked into his new office at the Napa, California corporate headquarters of 
Beringer Wine Estates Holdings (“Beringer”) on Monday morning, June 1, 1997, and found a 
note from his new boss, CEO Walter T. Klenz.  The note read: “Welcome, Pete, to Beringer and 
to the beginning of a new career path in the world of publicly-traded corporations!” It directed 
him to a meeting with other senior managers, the Board of Directors, and key investors of the 
privately held firm.2
Klenz opened the meeting by stating its primary objective: “We are all here to prepare a 
business plan that will result in Beringer Wine Estates becoming a publicly-held company.” He 
turned to Peter Scott and said “we will all be working on the details, Pete, but your responsibility 
is to coordinate and control this effort.” 
 
Earlier in the spring, the board had set a target for the new issue—Fall 1997.  Since, 
typically, most companies’ Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) were not well received by the equity 
markets and their investors during the end-of-year holiday season, Scott’s window for a 
successful offering was probably only a maximum of four months. 3
The top management team believed that Beringer’s operations had achieved a sustainable 
growth rate in revenues of more than of 10 percent per annum.  [See Exhibits 1–3 for Beringer’s 
consolidated income statements and operating data.] The value of Beringer’s brand portfolio was 
substantial and continued to grow as it expanded product offerings up the premium wine price 
scale. The wine business was capital intensive. Therefore, in order to sustain and increase 
growth, access to a broad range of financial sources of capital would be a critical element in 
achieving Beringer’s strategic goals. Its current capital structure reflected over $200 million of 
residual long-term debt from a leveraged buyout (LBO) in 1996. [See Exhibits 4 and 5 for 
Beringer’s consolidated balance sheets and statements of cash flow.] The team felt that reducing 
the combined risk of high operating and financial leverage and at the same time expanding 
capital choices could enhance revenue growth prospects to above 15 percent per year.  An IPO 
would also reward patient investors by providing them with liquidity and an exit route for their 
holdings in Beringer. 
 
Scott and his management team worked diligently throughout the summer of 1997 to 
implement his board’s directives. One critical component of the IPO process was the choice of 
an investment banker. Although there were a number of interviews, this decision resulted in 
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one of the easiest for Scott. Beringer’s current owners, Texas Pacific Group (TPG), had worked 
on a number of deals with Goldman Sachs over the years.  In addition, another winery, the 
Robert Mondavi Company, had gone public approximately four years earlier and the lead 
underwriter was Goldman Sachs. Everyone at Beringer felt comfortable with Goldman Sachs—
the Mondavi issue had been well accepted by the investment community and Goldman Sachs 
understood the wine business. It seemed a natural fit.4
With Goldman Sachs announced as the underwriter and internal progress being made 
throughout the firm, at its August meeting Beringer’s board had asked Scott, “Are you ready? 
Can we take Beringer public before the holidays?” After a brief pause, Scott’s reply was in the 
affirmative. 
 
Some critical questions needed to be addressed by both Beringer management and 
Goldman Sachs. What would be the size of the issue in dollars? How many shares would be 
issued to the public and in what price range? How could TPG keep voting control of the 
ownership of the business?  What would be the use of proceeds from a successful offering? How 
much stock must be sold in order to create an efficient market environment for the shares and the 
shareholders? What should be the target capital structure of the firm after the IPO? 
 
After Goldman Sachs had been selected as the lead underwriter, some of these questions 
began to be answered, at least on a preliminary basis. A target of approximately $100 million 
was selected to meet financing needs of the firm and efficiency and liquidity needs of the 
investment market. With an initial target price range of $21 to $23 per share, a 5 million-share 
offering was discussed at length. The net proceeds would enable the firm to refinance some of 
the most expensive and confining components of its current capital structure, the preferred stock 
and the subordinated note. [See Exhibit 6 for characteristics of Beringer’s financial structure.] 
The firm’s debt/total capital ratio would also move towards a more manageable and efficient 
range of 60-65 percent from its current levels in excess of 75 percent, on a book value basis.5
Finally, current equity holders of Beringer were interested in maintaining voting control of the 
company after any IPO. Therefore, it was decided that only Class B shares would be sold to the 
public. 
 
Current equity holders of Beringer were interested in maintaining voting control of the 
firm.  There were two classes of common stock created at the time of the Nestlé buyout.  Class A 
shares had 20 votes each while Class B shares had one vote each.  It was decided that only Class 
B shares would be sold to the public. 
 
Beringer formally announced its IPO intentions on August 27, 1997. A “road show” was 
scheduled by Goldman Sachs for the middle two weeks of October.  Upon its completion, 
representatives of the Board of Directors, management, and the underwriters would meet in New 
York City and, after equity market trading closed down on Monday, October 27th, determine 
final pricing and the number of shares to be sold in the IPO, expected to be released to the 
markets on Tuesday morning. 
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BERINGER’S HISTORY 
 
In 1875 two German emigrants, Jacob and Frederick Beringer, purchased property in St. 
Helena, California, for $14,500. The following year Jacob began working his new vineyards and 
started construction of a stone winery building. He employed Chinese laborers to build limestone 
aging tunnels for his product.  In 1880, Frederick opened a store and a wine cellar to 
accommodate the sale of wine in New York. The Beringer Brothers commenced an education 
and marketing program to introduce Napa Valley wine to the East Coast market.  Their specialty, 
even in those early years, was premium table wines. 
 
The winery was continuously owned by Beringer family members until 1971, when they 
sold it to the Nestlé Company.  Over the next 25 years, Nestlé hired management to implement 
an expansion strategy that included purchase and development of extensive acreage positions in 
prime growing regions of Napa, Sonoma, Lake, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo counties in 
California. Ownership of these vineyards enabled the firm to control a source of high quality, 
premium wine grapes at an attractive cost. The operation, renamed Wine World Estates, also 
acquired and developed a number of California wineries, including Beringer, Meridian 
Vineyards, and Chateau Souverain. 
 
In a series of sweeping moves overseen by Wine World’s winemaker, Myron 
Nightingale, operations were overhauled, the winery was retooled, vineyards were acquired, long 
term vineyard leases were negotiated and the company focused on the production and sale of 
great wines. The winery achieved a reputation for being thorough in its operations rather than 
taking shortcuts to achieve its objectives. 
 
Results of these initiatives began to bear fruit in the late 1980s. New private reserve 
wines were winning accolades throughout the industry and, overall, wine quality was rising 
rapidly. Wine World began to redefine itself as a top-quality producer, slowly but steadily 
shedding its prior image for making “ordinary wines.” 
 
In 1984, Michael Moone spearheaded operations of Wine World and accelerated 
transformation of the firm. Moone pursued expansion via both acquisitions and start-ups of new 
brands. Chateau Souverain, located in the Sonoma Valley, was acquired in 1986. Also that year a 
new brand, Napa Ridge was launched. The Estrella River Winery in Paso Robles was revamped 
as Meridian Vineyards in 1988. 
 
In 1990, Moone relinquished his CEO position to current chairman Walter Klenz.  Klenz 
had joined Wine World in 1976, first working in marketing and then in financial operations.  
 
In early 1996, Moone reentered the market with a private company named Silverado 
Partners. Together with dealmaker David Bonderman, who headed the Texas Pacific Group 
(TPG), a leveraged buyout of Wine World Estates was engineered by Moone.  The $350 million 
plus deal resulted in the business going back to its roots, with the new name of Beringer Wine 
Estates. 
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One of the most important goals of venture capital sponsored leveraged buyouts is an “exit 
strategy” to realize positive returns on their investment. The principals of TPG had chosen the 
Beringer operations and completed their acquisition with this goal in mind. In addition to its 
strong brand recognition in the product marketplace, it was expected that, when a public sale of 
shares was made, they would be well received by investors, especially those familiar with this 
industry. 
 
Klenz’s strategic vision for Beringer included internal growth, through brand 
development, and external growth of the firm’s business through mergers and/or acquisitions.  A 
publicly traded company would create the greatest financial flexibility in order to accomplish its 
goals as well as to provide liquidity for current owners. This meant preparing the company for 
life as a public firm.6 Management information systems needed to be enhanced, accounting, 
reporting, and control systems needed to be put into place and the firm needed to keep its records 
on a quarterly basis, to comply with SEC requirements. Doug Walker was hired in 1996 to 
implement many of these systems, but the final piece of the puzzle was the hiring of a chief 
financial officer, in order to coordinate these activities as well as to plan for future operations. 
 
Early in June of 1997, Peter F. Scott was brought on board as a senior vice president for 
finance and operations. Scott had spent seven years with Kendall-Jackson Winery, most recently 
as senior vice president, finance and administration. He had also spent six years as a 
management consultant and eight years with a nationally-known public accounting firm.  He 
learned of Beringer’s IPO plans and became intimately involved with their preparation from the 
outset. 
Beringer’s Financial History   
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BERINGER’S FINANCIAL HISTORY 
 After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestlé from 1971 through 1995, TPG 
Partners, L.P. acquired all the then outstanding common stock of Beringer Wine Estates 
Company in 1996. The total purchase price was approximately $371 million, which included net 
cash paid of $258 million, short-term mezzanine financing provided by the seller of $96 million, 
and acquisition costs of $17 million. 
 
Beringer’s capital structure on January 1, 1996, was composed of: 7 
Item Amount Dollars
Class A Common Stock   938,000 shares $ 4.66 million
Class B Common Stock 9,058,590 shares 45.04 million
Total Shares 9,996,590 shares $49.70 million
Series A Preferred Stock 300,000 shares $27.05 million
Credit Agreement (maximum 
 of $150 million) $86.00 million
Term Loan, Tranche B 
 (secured by all properties) $150.00 million
Term Loan, Tranche A 
 (secured by all properties) $20.00 million
Senior Subordinated Notes $33.24 million
Total Long Term Financing $287.00 million
The buying group put together this financing package and utilized financial leverage to the 
fullest extent possible, given the size of their equity commitment ($50 million) and the 
willingness and ability of financial institutions to lend them the remaining funds. 
 
On April 1, 1996, the company acquired the net assets of Chateau St. Jean from Suntory 
International Corporation.  Net cash paid to the seller amounted to $29.3 million, with 
acquisition costs of $1.9 million, for a total purchase price of $31.2 million. 
 
In order to pay for this acquisition, the company issued 945,000 Class B common shares 
for a net proceeds of $4.725 million. Subsequently, in September 1996, the company issued 
11,980 Class A shares and 224,380 Class B shares to investors, resulting in net proceeds of 
$825,000. 
 
On February 28, 1997 Beringer acquired Stags’ Leap Winery, Inc. from Stags’ Leap 
Associates and various individuals. Net cash paid to the sellers amounted to $19.2 million; with a 
note due the seller aggregating $2.85 million.  Together with transactions expenses of $1.15 
million the total cost amounted to $23.2 million. 
 
In March 1997, the company issued 833,334 shares of Class B common stock, resulting 
in net proceeds of $4,955,000. It may be observed that the average price at which common stock 
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(A & B) was sold varied from $4.97 per share in January 1996, to $5 per share in April 1996. By 
September of that year, the price was only $3.50 per share. Finally, in March of 1997 the average 
selling price had rebounded to approximately $5.95 per share. For comparative purposes, book 
value per share was $4.17 as of June 30, 1996 and $3.46 as of June 30, 1997. 
 
BERINGER’S STRATEGY IN THE 1990s 
 
By the late 1990s, Beringer had achieved a leadership position in the premium wine 
market in the United States. A number of strategies contributed to this position and would 
continue to be implemented by the firm. “You have to establish some fundamental themes for 
your company” Klenz remarked, “and you have to be careful you don’t have too complex a 
message.” In a 1997 interview published in the Wine Spectator, Klenz had remarked: 
 
There’s no secret to what drives Beringer Wine Estates. Its wineries focus on 
wines that consumers like to drink in the styles and prices that are most 
popular. The challenge is how do you make wines at all these different price 
points. It’s not volume – it’s quality we’re after. That’s what’s made us and 
that’s what we’re going to focus on.8
Beringer marketed a portfolio of six brands of wines from major California premium 
growing areas across all premium price segments. This multi-brand portfolio provided 
opportunities for growth at each price point without diluting the value of any individual brand. In 
addition, this portfolio offered consumers a choice of familiar and appealing products that were 
differentiated by variety, region, and price, while providing distributors with a broad assortment 
of brands for their selling efforts. To supplement its domestic brands and to meet the growing 
U.S. demand for premium wine, Beringer had imported products from a number of countries for 
more than a quarter century. In recent years they had been working with winemakers in Italy, 
Chile, and Southern France to produce premium wines designed to compete in the rapidly 
growing $ 7 to $10 a bottle market segment. 
 
High quality products at competitive prices had been central to Beringer’s strategy since 
its days under Nestlé’s control.  The firm’s current team of 14 experienced winemakers produced 
these wines using high quality premium wine grapes and state-of-the-art equipment in each stage 
of the winemaking process. For their efforts, the company had achieved considerable acclaim 
from industry experts. For example, in 1996, eight Beringer brands were included in Wine 
Spectator's “Top 100” wines of the world, more than any other wine company since that survey 
began in 1988. 
 
Premium variety grapes were among the most important determinants of wine quality and 
a significant component of product costs. Beringer produced a larger percentage of its grape 
requirements (excluding White Zinfandel requirements) from premium varietals than most of its 
competitors.  This strategy enabled Beringer to improve its control over grape quality and costs 
as well as to help assure continuity of grape supply. Grape supply and prices were cyclical, 
inasmuch as many uncontrollable factors impacted the quantity and quality of grapes produced in  
any given year.
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Beringer either owned or controlled through long-term leases approximately 9,400 acres in 
California's prime wine growing regions of Napa, Sonoma, Lake, Santa Barbara, and San Luis 
Obispo counties. In crop year 1996, approximately 23.4 percent of overall grape requirements 
were grown on its owned or controlled vineyards.  When White Zinfandel requirements were 
excluded from the calculations, 48 percent of requirements were supplied by owned or controlled 
vineyards.  To meet requirements for White Zinfandel, the company strategy was to purchase 
grapes or bulk wine, primarily through long-term contracts. 
 
Simultaneously, during the 1990s a number of major trends emerged in the California 
wine industry. These trends included: consolidation of the industry’s “three-tier” distribution 
network (winery-wholesaler/distributor-retailer), consumers’ “trading up” from inexpensive jug 
wines to premium priced varietal wines such as Chardonnay, Merlot, and Cabernet Sauvignon, 
and the development of “second-label wines” at moderate price points by many producers.  
 
In response, Beringer purchased Chateau St. Jean and Stags’ Leap wineries. By acquiring 
these attractively positioned wineries, Beringer was able to immediately diversify its brand 
portfolio and achieve operating efficiencies by integrating sales, marketing, and administrative 
functions. Beringer also believed that its professional management could improve wine quality 
and increase productivity at the acquired wineries, resulting in increasing sales and profitability. 
Management expected to continue to evaluate acquisition candidates and make strategic winery 
acquisitions on a highly selective basis. 
 
The firm’s wineries and product brands were of varying sizes, with products at different 
price points. “Pieces of the business can grow at varying rates,” said Klenz, “and we do want to 
focus on growth because the market rewards growth. But you can’t take a broad-brush approach 
and say we’re going to grow all the brands by 10 percent…it’s the $7 to $10 [price] range that’s 
Beringer’s focus.” Because it was incrementally less costly and time-consuming to expand a 
winery’s production than to start a new brand, prospects for growth at its larger wineries, 
Meridian and Napa Ridge, was apparent.  At Beringer’s smaller wineries, such as St. Jean and 
Souverain, the emphasis was to “drive their reputations,” rather than volume.9
Consumer marketing had also become an integral component of Beringer's strategy. It 
used sophisticated marketing techniques more typical of consumer packaged goods companies 
than of wine producers. These techniques included product branding, advertising, product 
publicity, and packaging initiatives in consumer marketing, as well as extensive trade marketing 
targeted at the second and third tier wholesale/distribution and retail channels. 
 
By 1997, Beringer had achieved exceptional depth and experience in both the wine and 
branded consumer packaged goods industries. The average tenure of the company’s senior 
management in the wine industry was 19 years while their average tenure at Beringer was 14 
years. The team had produced an exceptional record of performance in recent years and expected 
to continue and even enhance operating effectiveness in the future. 
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DIRECT COMPETITION 
 There were hundreds of wine producers operating in the United States in the 1990s. Most 
were relatively small operations, located primarily in California. There were approximately 
1,500 wineries in operation, yet the top 20 produced almost 90 percent of all American wines.  
Of the larger firms, probably the most well-known was the E&J Gallo Wine Company, which 
had recently established a premium varietal winery, Gallo of Sonoma.  [See Exhibit 7 for a list 
of the top 20 brands of U.S. domestic table wine producers.] 
 
Consolidation among wineries began to accelerate, as smaller wineries decided to sell to 
larger ones in order to achieve greater economies of scale in marketing and economies of scope 
in gaining access to distribution channels. The “consolidators” were generally public firms that 
were able to offer predominantly family-run wine businesses a means to greater liquidity of their 
investment in a larger, more diversified operation. Concurrently, the attractiveness of 
California’s wine industry to entrepreneurs continued unabated as new, small operations were 
started each year. 
 
A handful of U.S. wineries had completed or were known to be in the process of offering 
their stock to the public as a means of raising capital and achieving greater investment valuation 
and liquidity. Most prominent among the public wineries was the Robert Mondavi Corporation, 
which had a portfolio of brands similar to Beringer’s. By 1997, Mondavi had been public for 
approximately four years. Canandaigua Wine Company, another publicly held business, was by 
contrast a much larger, more diversified beverage producer than either Beringer or Mondavi, 
following a strategy of expansion in the wine business that was primarily facilitated by mergers 
and/or acquisitions. [See Exhibit 8 for comparative company product portfolios.] 
 
The Robert Mondavi Corporation   
The Robert Mondavi Company was founded in 1966 by its eponymous owner and 
winemaker, Robert Mondavi, to produce quality premium table wines that would compete with 
the finest wines in the world.  Its strategy was to sell its wines across all principal price segments 
of the premium wine market. The company also sold wine under importing and marketing 
agreements with other business entities.10 Recent financial data for Robert Mondavi are shown in 
Exhibits 9–12.
Products were sold through a global network of over 200 leading distributors in the U.S. 
and 90 countries around the world. These distributors then resold the product to restaurants and 
retail outlets. Substantial portions of Robert Mondavi’s wine sales were concentrated in 
California and, to a lesser extent, in New York, New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and 
Massachusetts.  Export sales accounted for approximately 8 percent of net revenues, with major 
markets in Canada, Europe, and Asia. Several international joint ventures allowed the company 
to market wines from Italy, France, and Chile, as well as those from California vineyards. 
 
Direct Competition 
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Robert Mondavi had been expanding its holdings of prime wine producing acreage over the 
years, to a current level (1997) of over 5,000 acres. In addition, it had solidified excellent long-
term relationships with grape-growing partners. 
 
For more than three decades, the Robert Mondavi name had been synonymous with 
winegrowing excellence, marketing innovation and environmental integrity. Together, these 
translated into extraordinary brand equity for Robert Mondavi and its principal wine products. 
Brand strength and the firm’s ability to maintain and build on its strength have been among the 
Robert Mondavi Corporation’s most important assets and considered key to its continued 
success. 
 
In the 1990s there had been a proliferation of wine brands and expectations were that this 
trend would continue into the foreseeable future. In this environment, only brands with a clear, 
quality image and strong consumer franchise were likely to succeed and grow in market share 
and profitability.  The brands in the Robert Mondavi portfolio had precisely these characteristics. 
Each of the firm’s nine brands had a distinct personality, served a defined market niche, and 
leveraged Robert Mondavi’s global reputation, distributor network, and infrastructure. 
 
From a marketing perspective, the Robert Mondavi portfolio served the broad spectrum 
of consumer demand. There were brands that appealed to the first-time wine drinker as well as to 
the experienced oenophile (wine connoisseur). Brands were sold at supermarkets and club stores 
as well as fine wine shops and restaurants. Brands were created for every day enjoyment of 
consumers, as well as for  “special occasions.” 
 
The company had a clear formula for its current success and future competitiveness in the 
wine market. It obtained the finest grapes available, maintained state-of-the-art production 
facilities, and utilized innovative marketing strategies. A powerful distribution network resulted 
in growing acceptance of Robert Mondavi’s well-defined brands in the competitive market 
environment of the 1990s. 
 
Canandaigua Wine Company, Inc.
Canandaigua Wine and its subsidiaries operated in the alcoholic beverage industry. The 
firm was a producer and supplier of wines, an importer and producer of beers and distilled 
spirits, and a producer and supplier of grape juice concentrate in the United States. It maintained 
a portfolio of more than 125 national and regional brands of beverage alcohol, which were 
distributed by over 1,400 wholesalers throughout the United States and selected international 
markets. Its beverage alcohol brands were marketed in five general categories: table wines, 
sparkling wines, dessert wines, imported beer, and distilled spirits.11 Recent financial data for 
Canandaigua are shown in Exhibits 13–16.
Internal growth in support of the firm’s brands had been supplemented by an active 
acquisition strategy over the last five years. In October 1993, Canandaigua acquired all of the 
tangible and intangible assets of Vintners International Company, Inc. and Hammondsport 
winery for a purchase price of $148.9 million. Vintners was the fifth largest supplier of wine in  
Beringer Wine Estates Holdings, Inc. 1997 
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the United States, owning two of the country’s most highly-recognized brands, Paul Masson and 
Taylor California Cellars. 
 
In August 1995, Canandaigua acquired the Inglenook and Almaden brands, the fifth and 
sixth largest selling table wines in the United States, a grape juice concentrate business and 
wineries in Madera and Escolon, California, from Heublein, Inc.  The company also acquired 
Belaire Creek Cellars, Chateau La Salle and Charles Le Franc table wines, Le Domaine 
champagnes, and Almaden, Hartley, and Jacques Bonet brandy. The aggregate consideration for 
these brands and properties was $130.6 million in cash and options to purchase 600,000 shares of 
Class A common stock; 200,000 exercisable at $30 per share; and 400,000 exercisable at $35 per 
share, at any time up to August 5, 1996.  All of these options expired unexercised, on August 5, 
1996. 
 
In September 1995, Canandaigua, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, Barton 
Incorporated, acquired certain assets of United Distillers Glenmore, Inc., and certain of its North 
American affiliates.  Included in this transaction were rights to the Fleischmann’s, Sköl, Mr. 
Boston, Canadian LTD, Old Thompson, Kentucky Tavern, Chi-Chi’s, Glenmore, and di Amore 
distilled spirits brands. In addition, the deal included the U.S. rights to InverHouse, Schenley, 
and El Toro distilled spirits brands, along with inventories and other assets. The aggregate 
consideration for these acquired brands and other assets was $141.78 million, plus assumption of 
certain current liabilities.    
 
THE BEVERAGE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Consumption of beverages purchased by consumers in the U.S. had grown steadily, yet 
unspectacularly, in the 1990s. Total annual consumption per capita expanded from 154.3 gallons 
in 1991 to over 164.5 gallons in 1996.  By far the largest beverage category was soft drinks. At a 
level of 54.2 gallons per capita in 1996, soft drinks represented 31.4 percent of total beverage 
spending at retail. They also represented one of the few categories that were growing in both 
absolute and relative terms in the 1990s. Soft drinks’ absolute growth of 6.4 gallons per capita in 
the 1990s was by far the largest in any single beverage consumption category.  On a relative 
basis, their annual growth rate of 2.7 percent was second only to the 4.9 percent growth rate in 
the bottled water category. Bottled water nevertheless owned a market share just over one-fifth 
as large as that of soft drinks. [Exhibit 17.] 
 
U.S. Wine Consumption 
Wine consumption per capita remained fairly steady in the 1990s, fluctuating only 
slightly between 1.7 and 1.9 gallons per capita. [Exhibit 18.]  After rising steadily in the late 
1970s and through most of the 1980s, absolute and relative growth had slowed considerably in 
the last decade. On the basis of retail spending, however, the wine market represented 6.1 
percent of the beverage industry. Although this was down from the 6.5 percent levels of the early 
1990s, it showed how these higher value products ranked in importance at the retail level. 
 [Exhibit 19.]
The Beverage Industry in the United States 
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Major segments in the wine industry included the following broad categories: table, fortified, 
vermouth, sparkling, coolers, and ciders. The largest category, by consumption, was table wines, 
representing an 81.6 percent market share in 1996, up steadily from 79.4 percent in 1993. 
Domestically produced wines represented the largest segment of the market. In 1993, 85.7 
percent of all wine categories were produced domestically, with the remainder being imported. 
With imports rising at a rate of almost 13 percent per year between 1993 and 1996, their share 
had grown from 14.3 percent of the market to 18.8 percent over this four-year period. [Exhibit 
20.]
Wine shipments into the wholesale distribution channel trended downward from 1985 
levels of 244 million cases to the 189 million case level in 1993.  Since that time, however, there 
had been a reversal, with shipments reaching 213 million cases in 1996 and an estimated 220 
million for calendar 1997. Sparkling wines, coolers, and other wine categories reached their peak 
of consumer acceptance as far back as 1987 and have since been declining fairly steadily to a 
range of only approximately one-third those lofty levels. [Exhibit 21.]
California table wine shipments had grown continuously from 43.4 percent of the 
industry in 1985 to 63.2 percent in 1996. Wine production from other U.S. states had grown by 
almost 80 percent since 1985, yet still accounted for only 5 percent of U.S. shipments in 1996. 
Jug wines made up almost 85 percent of California table wine shipments in 1985. This trend has 
been down for most of the last decade, until a low of approximately 56 percent was reached in 
1993. Even with an upturn in shipments over the last three years, this percentage continued 
downward, reaching 51 percent in 1996. 
 
The growth segment of the California table wine industry may be found in the various 
“premium” categories defined below. Revenues at the wholesale level show even stronger 
growth in the premium categories, implying that prices have been robust, resulting in faster 
growth in revenues than in shipments.   
 
U.S. Wine Production 
The internal structure of the wine industry in the United States had been undergoing 
fundamental changes in terms of product, especially in the table wine category. As the largest 
segment of production and value of shipments at over 80 percent in 1996, these products have 
been responding to changes in the tastes and preferences of consumers for higher quality, 
premium wines. [Exhibits 22.]
The grapes used to produce table wine are of varying quality. Varietals are delicate, thin-
skinned grapes whose vines usually take approximately four years to begin bearing fruit. As 
defined by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms truth-in-labeling standards, one 
variety—the name of a single grape — may be used if not less than 75 percent of the wine was 
derived from grapes of that variety, the entire 75 percent of which was grown in the labeled 
appellation of origin.  Appellation denoted that “…at least 75 percent of a wine’s volume was 
derived from fruit or agricultural products and grown in place or region indicated….”12 To 
develop the typical varietal characteristics that result in enhanced flavor, taste, and finish could 
take another 2-3 years. These additional growing periods increased both investment costs and 
 product quality.
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“Table” wines are those with 7-14 percent alcohol content by volume and are traditionally 
consumed with food. This is in contrast to other wine products such as sparkling wines 
(champagnes), wine coolers, pop wines, and fortified wines, which are typically consumed as 
stand-alone beverages. Table wines that retail at less than $3.00 per 750 ml. bottle are generally 
considered to be generic or “jug” wines, while those selling for more than $3.00 per bottle are 
considered premium wines.  
 
Premium wines generally have a vintage date on their labels. This means that the product 
was made with at least 95 percent of grapes harvested, crushed, and fermented in the calendar 
year shown on the label and used grapes from an appellation of origin. (i.e., Napa Valley, 
Sonoma Valley, Central Coast, etc.).  Within the premium table wine category, a number of 
market segments have emerged, based on retail price points. Popular premium wines generally 
fall into the $3.00 - $7.00 per bottle range, while super premium wines retail for $7.00 - $14.00. 
The ultra premium category sells for $14.00 - $20.00 per bottle. Any retail price above $20.00 
per bottle is considered luxury premium. [Exhibit 23.]
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT IN 1997 
The United States’ economy continued its extraordinary performance during 1997.13 [See 
Exhibit 24 for data from selected financial markets from June – September 1997.] Growth in the 
gross domestic product extended gains that began with the end of the last recession, officially 
dated as March 1991. Unemployment continued a long-term decline, personal, national income 
grew robustly, and inflation at both the producer and consumer levels was historically low and 
continuing to decline.  In international markets the U.S. dollar remained strong, especially 
against Asian currencies that linked their currencies to the dollar. 
 
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, expressed a bit of skepticism toward 
this performance. He stated that the U.S. economy was on an “unsustainable track.” This opinion 
resulted in fear of an interest rate increase to slow down economic activity and prevent a flair-up 
in inflation. 
 
Financial markets are not only reflective of activities in the U.S., but also of international 
conditions.  Problems started to materialize in Asia during the summer months of 1997. A 
collapse of financial markets in Thailand, followed by those in Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia resulted from the bursting of real estate and stock market bubbles in those countries. 
Trophy buildings were being constructed on a speculative basis and financed with long-term 
bank lending. Commercial banks in these nations funded these assets with short-term foreign 
borrowings, many denominated in dollars and other hard currencies. When real estate and stock 
prices collapsed, the result was a full-fledged banking crisis as financial institutions’ collateral 
went up in smoke. 
 
Investors all headed for the exits at the same time, desperately seeking to convert their 
local currency holdings into dollars. The result was a collapse of these currencies and an ever- 
stronger dollar than might have been warranted by the exceptional performance of the U.S. 
economy.
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This cashing in of local currencies inevitably led to dramatic decreases in domestic money 
supplies. As the credit-worthiness of almost every company and bank in the region came into 
question, their ability to borrow abroad was seriously impaired that a general liquidity crisis 
occurred, and the malaise began to spread. 
 
As these same elements unexpectedly appeared in South Korea, the world’s eleventh 
largest economy, the world received a stern financial wake-up call. A deep and prolonged 
recession in Asia now appeared quite probable. Worries also spread that this “Asian Flu” could 
extend into Japan, the world’s second largest economy. If this occurred, could the “Goldilocks 
economy” of the West fall prey to these Asian ills? 
 
THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1997 
Financial markets in the United States performed reasonably well throughout the summer 
and early fall of 1997. Valuations were quite high, historically, with the S & P 500 trading 
between 24 and 26 times, trailing earnings in early October. Late in the third week of that month, 
just as the Beringer road show was ending, the equity markets in the U.S. commenced a 
precipitous decline. On Thursday and Friday, October 23 and 24, the DJIA declined by 320 
points. The following Monday a decline of 554 Dow points took place, “the largest single 
numerical drop in the history of the DJIA.” 14 
From an all time high of 8259 on August 6, when the DJIA market capitalization stood at 
$1.94 trillion, as of Monday evening, October 26, the market cap was $1.54 trillion, a decline of 
20.8 percent.  For Monday’s trading alone, $129 billion of value disappeared, representing a 
decline of 6.6 percent. Over these three days the bond markets were also affected by a “flight to 
quality.” The 30-year Treasury yield declined from 6.42 percent on October 22 to close at 6.13 
percent on October 27. 
 
Equity strategists at leading financial institutions had a variety of interpretations and 
opinions concerning these violent swings in security prices.  “It could go down thirty percent or 
forty percent” from this year’s market peaks warned Barton Biggs, chief global strategist at 
Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter Discover, in a conference call to clients and on television 
appearances. Ralph Acampora, technical analyst at Prudential Securities and a bull, pulled in his 
horns.  He became “temporally negative” on the stock market and warned his firm’s sales force 
of a “nasty market correction” to come. 
 
A Barrons Roundtable regular, Jim Rogers, shuttling between a Peter Jennings interview 
on ABC and another on-camera session with CNBC that eventful evening, opined that the sell 
off “could be the beginning of a major bear market, the Big Kahuna itself” that would send 
financial asset prices crashing around the world.15 
 
In contrast, Edward Kerschner, head of Paine Weber’s investment policy committee, told 
clients that if market prices fell another 5 percent from their closing levels on Monday, October 
27, “it would be a compelling buying opportunity.” His models showed that the markets were 5 
percent undervalued. “If prices become 10 percent undervalued, it’s time to buy.”
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Finally, Abby Joseph Cohen, strategist at Goldman Sachs and a prominent stock market bull for 
most of the 1990s, published the following commentary at the close of trading Friday, October 
24. “Despite the Asian troubles, the United States’ economic and profit outlook remains solid.” 
With Asian markets disrupted, the U.S. should prove a safe haven for investment money. 
 
As a result of the further, extraordinary decline on Monday, October 27, she actually 
boosted her allocation to stocks in Goldman’s model portfolio from 60 percent to 65 percent. “I 
was calm and confident because everything in my work indicated that the economy was going 
great from the standpoint of jobs, profit growth and muted inflation pressures. It was just one of 
those classic moments when emotion caused the market to become disoriented from economic 
reality.”16 
PETER SCOTT’S DILEMMA 
 
The meeting on the Monday evening of October 27th was anything but upbeat.  The DJIA 
had finished the day down over 550 points due to lingering fears from the Asian financial crisis. 
How would these events affect Beringer’s decision? Should it go ahead with the offering and risk 
disenfranchising new shareholders if stock prices continued to decline?  Or should it follow the 
suggestions of Goldman Sachs, as it had been doing for the past few months? 
 
Although the IPO market in recent months had shown continued strength and receptivity 
for many types of companies, Peter Scott remembered two charts prepared for him by the 
underwriters [Exhibit 25 and 26].  They showed clearly how volatile the IPO markets could be.  
Although considered quite strong at the moment, they could cool off very quickly for an 
extended period of time.  Postponing the issue could mean waiting for perhaps another three to 
six months or more, which could adversely affect strategic initiatives planned for the next year. 
 
Postponement of the IPO for any appreciable length of time would also generate other 
concerns that would have to be addressed by the Beringer management team.  In private board 
meetings a few scenarios had been proposed and “played out” for the next four years.  They 
included various assumptions concerning company growth rates and their financial statement 
implications. 
 
Going through Peter’s mind was the possibility of using debt sparingly, only enough to 
keep Beringer’s current debt/equity ratios roughly constant.  A 10 percent growth in revenues 
could be achieved, just by keeping the firm’s market share unchanged.  A 15 percent growth rate 
could be achieved if the firm utilized internally generated cash flow, increased its use of debt, 
and utilized its equity at book value for one or more strategic acquisitions. 
 
In another board meeting, there was a discussion of the impact of a successful IPO on the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of Beringer and how the reduced cost of equity could 
enhance prospects for external growth in the years ahead. 
 
Back in the boardroom at Goldman Sachs, executives were monitoring market sentiment 
and discussing investor reactions to current circumstances.   Based upon indications of interest 
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being kept by underwriters during the road show, the issue was sure to be oversubscribed.  In 
fact, based on preliminary indications of potential demand, the target price range had been 
increased the previous week to $23 to $26 per share.17 Before the stock market swoon on 
Monday, the range had been raised once more, to $26 to $28 per share. Klenz asked everyone at 
the meeting — particularly Peter Scott—to voice an opinion. 
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